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Abstract—Existing power analysis techniques rely on strong adversary models with prior knowledge of the leakage or training data.
We introduce side-channel analysis with unsupervised learning (SCAUL) that can recover the secret key without requiring prior
knowledge or profiling (training). We employ an LSTM auto-encoder to extract features from power traces with high mutual information
with the data-dependent samples of the measurements. We demonstrate that by replacing the raw measurements with the
auto-encoder features in a classical DPA attack, the efficiency, in terms of required number of measurements for key recovery,
improves by 10X. Further, we employ these features to identify a leakage model with sensitivity analysis and multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) networks. SCAUL uses the auto-encoder features and the leakage model, obtained in an unsupervised approach, to find the
correct key. On a lightweight implementation of AES on Artix-7 FPGA, we show that SCAUL is able to recover the correct key with 3700
power measurements with random plaintexts, while a DPA attack requires at least 17400 measurements. Using misaligned traces, with
an uncertainty equal to 20% of the hardware clock cycle, SCAUL is able to recover the secret key with 12300 measurements while the
DPA attack fails to detect the key.
Index Terms—LSTM Auto-encoder, Power Analysis, Sensitivity Analysis, Side-Channel Analysis, Unsupervised Learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
S IDE-Channel Analysis (SCA) using power consumptionor electromagnetic (EM) emanations from electronic de-
vices is a powerful tool for inferring information about
hardware/software characteristics and processed data in
a computing platform. Side-channel analysis refers to a
technique in which behavior of a computing platform,
including power consumption, EM radiation, timing and
memory access, are observed to retrieve secret information.
An SCA attack that analyzes the power traces or EM signals
is usually referred to as power/EM analysis.
Power analysis (PA) has especially been employed to
compromise the security of different crypto-systems run-
ning on a computing platform. Examples include secret key
recovery from elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) running
on iOS and Android devices [1] and McEliece cryptosystem
implemented on FPGA [2], attacks on Xilinx bitstream en-
cryption [3], recovering the secret key of postquantum key
exchange protocols [4], [5], key recovery of Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) [6], symmetric encryption systems
[7], [8] and breaking the security of smart cards [9].
Existing power analysis techniques can be categorized
into two groups of model-based and profiling attacks. In
model-based attacks, prior knowledge of the leakage model
is assumed that defines a relationship between the power
consumption of a device and the processed data. In differen-
tial power analysis (DPA) [10], the measurements are clus-
tered into two or more classes of similar traces, according
to the leakage model. Statistics of the traces, e.g. the mean
of power samples in first-order DPA, represent the traces
in each cluster. The inter-cluster difference of the statistics
is used as a measure to identify the correct data. In corre-
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lation power analysis (CPA) [11], the correlation coefficient
between the power samples and the leakage model is used
as the statistic to identify the correct data.
A commonly used leakage model is Hamming Weight
(HW), according to which the power consumption of a
logic block is correlated with the HW of the processed data
[12]. Hamming Distance (HD) is also a popular model for
power consumption corresponding to memory transitions,
e.g. registers of microprocessors, in which the power is
correlated with the HD between the initial and final values
of memory elements [13]. Additionally, particular features of
measured power traces might also be correlated with single
bits of the data, e.g. the most significant bit (MSB) as used
in [14]. Switching glitches in hardware implementation of
logic functions and toggling activity of internal nodes of the
circuit are also shown to depend on data [6], [15].
Model-based power analysis relies on a significant
amount of prior knowledge of the details of the hardware
including the hardware architecture, CMOS technology,
the specific implementation of cipher operations, power
delivery circuitry, and even the layout of interconnects
in integrated circuits [16]. Profiling techniques use actual
power measurements of a device corresponding to known
processed data to develop more accurate leakage models. In
[17], a stochastic model is employed in which a polynomial
function of data with random coefficients represents the
mean of the leakage signal assumed to follow a Gaussian
distribution. The coefficients are estimated using linear or
ridge regression [17], [18].
Machine learning has been employed to develop leak-
age models in a profiling-based approach. Support vector
regression (SVR) is used in [19] to develop a mapping from
the bitwise representation of data to the power samples,
assumed to follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution. In
[20], a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network has
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2been employed, as a generic nonlinear leakage model, in
which the inputs are the bits of data and the outputs are the
mean of power samples corresponding to the data values.
A partition-based approach is introduced in [21], in which
a set of power traces corresponding to known data are
clustered using an unsupervised clustering algorithm such
as k-means. The clusters constitute the leakage model; the
sets of data at each cluster have similar power consumption.
Whether a leakage model is obtained a priori or through
profiling, power analysis also requires suitable statistics
of the power traces as distinguishers. Classical techniques
such as DPA and CPA use predefined statistics such as
first or higher order moments and the correlation coeffi-
cient of individual power samples with a leakage model.
Mutual information and KolmogorovSmirnov statistics are
also used as alternative distinguishers [22], [23]. More recent
techniques use profiling to extract suitable statistics. In
template attacks [24], multivariate Gaussian distribution is
assumed for the power traces. The mean and covariance of
the distribution depends on the data and are estimated in a
profiling step. More advanced techniques exploit supervised
learning algorithms, such as support vector machine (SVM),
decision tree (DT) and random forest (RF) [25], and deep
learning [14], [26], to extract the most relevant features of
power traces, and develop proper distinguishers.
While profiling and supervised learning techniques are
the most powerful SCA attacks on cryptographic implemen-
tations, their success rate rapidly degrades if the training
set, captured during profiling on a reference device, slightly
deviates from the measurements on the target device under
attack. It is shown in [27] that the accuracy of an MLP neural
network in attacking AES running on an ATxmega128D4
microcontroller drops from 88.5% to less than 13.7% if the
MLP is trained with power measurements on one board,
and used to attack the same microcontroller, but on a dif-
ferent board. Having access to the identical hardware as the
target is a major limitation of profiling-based techniques.
In this work, we introduce an unsupervised learning
technique for side-channel analysis, called SCAUL, which
does not require any training set for profiling or a prior
knowledge of the leakage model. We employ a Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) auto-encoder to extract features from
power traces. The power features provide a similarity model
between the power traces. An MLP neural network is used
to map the power features to the processed data for a
key candidate. Using sensitivity analysis, a leakage model
is identified, which is the characteristic of the similarity
model extracted by the auto-encoder. The power features
are clustered based on the identified leakage model, and the
correct key exhibits the maximum inter-cluster difference.
We demonstrate the success of SCAUL on a lightweight
implementation of AES on FPGA, even with non-aligned
power traces.
The contributions of this work include: 1) We introduce
an LSTM auto-encoder that extracts data-dependent fea-
tures from measurements in an unsupervised approach. It
allows for a horizontal processing of power traces which
improves the efficiency of an attack significantly. 2) We
develop sensitivity analysis with MLP neural networks to
detect a leakage model in an unsupervised approach. 3) We
introduce the SCAUL technique for power analysis which
recovers the secret key without requiring prior knowledge
on a leakage model or profiling, even when data-dependent
features are distributed over random time samples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
an overview of different classes of existing power analysis
techniques is provided and the mathematical background
on the proposed SCAUL attack is developed. Section 3
describes the overall methodology of SCAUL, including the
LSTM neural network for feature extraction and sensitivity
analysis for leakage detection. A case study of the SCAUL
attack on an FPGA implementation of AES is discussed in
Section 4. Experimental results are presented in Section 5
and the paper concludes in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Attack Model
A general model for power analysis involves a key-
dependent cipher operation Fk() : Fm2 → Fn2 , a known
input data to the operation as Z ∈ Fm2 and an unknown
variable at the output of the operation as X ∈ Fn2 called the
intermediate or sensitive variable. In most block ciphers the
operation under attack is the nonlinear S-box function S()
whilem and n are the number of bits at the input and output
of the operation. The input Z and the intermediate variable
X are m-bit subsets of the input plaintext and the cipher
state, respectively. Further, the secret parameter k is anm-bit
subset of the entire secret key. Under this model, the S-box
operation can be represented as X = Fk(Z) = S(Z ⊕ k), in
which ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operation.
The fundamental property of a cipher operation ex-
ploited in power analysis to detect the secret key is in-
dependence of the output bits of the operation from the
input. Formally, using the binary representation of the
intermediate variable X as x¯ = (xi)i=0,1,··· ,m, we have
H(x¯r|Z) = H(x¯r), in which H() is the Shannon Entropy
and x¯r is any combination of r ∈ [1,m] bits of x¯. However,
H(x¯r|Z, k) = 0; i.e., having the secret key, the cipher op-
eration is a deterministic relation while without knowledge
on k, the operation is a random transformation. In power
analysis, the power consumption of the hardware imple-
mentation of the cipher operation is given as a vector of N
samples denoted byT ∈ RN . It is assumed that I(T; x¯) > 0,
in which I(a; b) is the mutual information between random
variables a and b.
Using the above properties, the primary idea of a power
analysis technique is as follows. Having a set of input values
to the cipher operation and the corresponding power traces
during execution of the operation, an attacker calculates the
values of the intermediate variable for all possible values of
the secret key k. Let x¯k∗ = Fk∗(Z) denote the output of the
cipher operation with the input Z and a key candidate k∗.
If k∗ is the correct key, I(T; x¯k∗) > 0 since I(T; x¯) > 0,
otherwise, I(T; x¯k∗) = 0. Hence, the mutual information
between the power traces and the intermediate variable
calculated for a key candidate can be considered as a metric
to rank key candidates. The highest rank belongs to the
correct key.
To implement a power attack in practice, the mutual
information between the intermediate variable and power
traces is usually expressed in the form of a leakage model.
3Fig. 1. Conceptual description of model-based power analysis techniques using a leakage model.
Let the function L() : Fm2 → RN denote the leakage model
which maps the m-bit intermediate variable X to the vector
of power trace T with N samples. A generic nonlinear
leakage model can be expressed as the following algebraic
normal form [18]
T˜ = L(X) = α0 +
∑
U∈Fm2 \{0}
αUX
U +  (1)
in which T˜ is the data-dependent component of the leakage
power,  is a noise and XU =
∏m
i=1 x
ui
i is a monomial of
degree d = HW (U) representing the product of bits of X at
the positions where the corresponding bits of U are 1.
2.2 Model-Based Attacks
In classical model-based power analysis, including DPA and
CPA, it is assumed that there is at least one sample of the
power trace T which is correlated with the intermediate
variable X according to (1), with fixed coefficients αU for
all samples. The power sample which exhibits the highest
correlation with the leakage model is chosen as the point of
interest (POI) for ranking the key candidates. In profiling-
based attacks, different coefficients might be estimated for
every sample of the power trace.
The overall procedure of a model-based attack is shown
in Fig. 1. A set of S power traces each with N samples,
denoted by Tj = (tj,1, tj,2, · · · , tj,N ), j = 1, 2, · · · , S, with
the corresponding inputs Zj to a cipher operation Fk() is
available. For every key candidate k∗, the corresponding
intermediate variable X for a power trace j is calculated
as Xj,k∗ = Fk∗(Zj). The power traces are grouped into C
clusters, in general, according to the calculated intermediate
values and the leakage model. For example, in an HW
model, it is assumed that the power traces corresponding
to the intermediate variables with the same HW are similar.
Hence, the clusters are Hc = {Xj,k∗ |HW (Xj,k∗) = c}
with c ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,m} for an m-bit X , and HW (X) =∑m−1
i=0 xi is the Hamming weight of X .
In classical techniques, statistics of the power traces in
a cluster are calculated for every sample of the trace. In
first order DPA, the mean of samples of power traces, i.e.
T¯c = (t¯c,1, t¯c,2, · · · , t¯c,N ), is used as the cluster statistic,
in which t¯c,n = EXj,k∗∈Hc [tj,n], n = 1, 2, · · · , N . In a
difference of means (DoM) test, the difference between the
means of power samples between any two combination of
clusters is used as the statistic to rank the key candidate k∗
[28]; the correct key exhibits the maximum difference. Alter-
natively, in mutual information analysis (MIA), the mutual
information between the measurements and the model is
used as the decision metric to rank the key candidates [29].
Higher order cluster statistics can also be used to attack
low-order masked implementations as in [30] and [31]. The
profiling-based leakage model can also be used in classical
DPA attacks for the purpose of clustering as exploited in
[18], [21].
Rather than clustering, in correlation power analysis
(CPA), a mathematical model, as in (1), is used to char-
acterize the data-dependent leakage [32], [33]. Thus, CPA
can be considered as a generalization of DPA and MIA in
which the number of clusters is equal to the space size
of the intermediate variable X . The Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between the measured power and the estimated
leakage according to the model is used to rank the key
candidates. The coefficients of the leakage model can be
assumed a priori, as in an HW or HD model, or obtained
through profiling in a stochastic model.
Profiling techniques are also used in identifying proper
cluster statistics and decision metrics in model-based at-
tacks. A popular profiling power analysis is template attack
(TA) in which the probability density function (pdf) of a
cluster is estimated in a profiling phase, given a set of power
traces corresponding to known intermediate variables [34].
These traces should be collected from the same hardware,
with known secret key, as the device under attack. The pdf
of clusters are called templates whose parameters depend on
data. During the attack phase, a measured power trace, from
the device with unknown secret key, is matched with the
templates using decision statistics such as maximum likeli-
hood (ML) or Bayesian statistics, i.e. maximum a posteriori
(MAP) estimation, to estimate the value of the intermediate
variable. Profiling can be used for both leakage modeling
and distribution estimation as in [19].
Classical model-based power analysis techniques as-
sume aligned measurements in which the data-dependent
features of power traces always appear at the same time
sample which is a major limitation for two reasons: 1) timing
of the measurements might not be precise relative to the
timing of the device under attack; and 2) simple counter-
4Fig. 2. Conceptual description of supervised power analysis techniques.
measures such as addition of random clock jitters can result
in the attack failure. Deep learning has been employed
to address the issue of misaligned power traces. In [14],
a convolutional neural network (CNN) is used to classify
power traces according to a leakage model, including HW
and MSB, for every key candidate. By adding a small
perturbation to the weights of a trained neural network for
a key candidate, the sensitivity of cluster probabilities to
the perturbation is calculated. The correct key exhibits the
highest sensitivity.
2.3 Supervised Learning Attacks
Modern profiling-based techniques employ supervised
learning to incorporate modeling of the leakage, extracting
the proper statistics and decision metrics into a single algo-
rithm, as shown in Fig. 2. In the terminology of supervised
learning, the profiling phase of the attack corresponds to
training and the attack or exploitation phase is equivalent to
inference or test.
In supervised learning attacks, a set of power traces with
known intermediate variables constitutes the training set.
The label of a power trace, used in training, is the value of
the corresponding intermediate variable. Supervised learn-
ing attacks have the flexibility to incorporate a leakage
model if available. For example, if it is known that the power
consumption is correlated with the HW of data, then the
training labels would be the HW of the intermediate vari-
able. Classical machine learning techniques use a leakage
model for classification [35], [36]. Further, these techniques
usually require a dimension reduction algorithm, such as
principal component analysis (PCA), to select points of
interest (POI) of power traces [25].
Power analysis based on deep learning has been shown
to be the most powerful profiling attack. The major ad-
vantages of deep learning include: 1) dimension reduction
algorithms are not necessary to identify POIs; the neural
networks can learn the most relevant features and decision
metrics for best classification, 2) the data-dependent features
can be identified even in misaligned traces, and 3) higher-
order statistics required to attack masked implementations
can be identified by neural networks. In [26], convolu-
tional neural networks (CNN), long short-term memory
(LSTM) and a stacked auto-encoder are employed for fea-
ture extraction and classification. The results show that deep
learning techniques outperform classical machine learning
algorithms such as SVM and RF. Multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) neural networks have also been shown to outperform
template attacks [37].
2.4 Unsupervised Feature Extraction
Auto-encoders are the most prominent concepts of unsuper-
vised learning in identifying data structure. Depending on
the architecture of the encoder/decoder and the optimiza-
tion goal, auto-encoders can be considered as generic non-
linear denoising filters and learning algorithms for estimat-
ing data distribution, identifying local manifold structure of
data, dimension reduction and feature extraction.
The basic concept of auto-encoders is simple. The input
to the auto-encoder is Tˆ which is a corrupted, or noisy,
version of the original data T. The encoder is a function
e() : RN → RD that maps the input data into an internal
representation space and the decoder d() : RD → RN maps
the representation back into the input space to reconstruct
the original data. The encoder and decoder functions are
obtained by minimizing a loss functionL(T, Tˆ) between the
original and reconstructed data. In a denoising auto-encoder
(DAE) [38], the optimization goal is to minimize the mean
of the loss function, i.e. E[L(T, Tˆ)]. The most popular loss
functions are the squared error and cross-entropy.
Auto-encoders with a proper optimization goal can also
be considered as manifold learning algorithms. A contrac-
tive auto-encoder (CAE) uses a regularization mechanism
in the optimization problem to restrict the space of en-
coder/decoder functions. The optimization goal of CAE is
e, d = arg min
e,d
E
[
L(T, Tˆ) + λ
∥∥∥∂e(T)
∂T
∥∥∥2
F
]
(2)
in which ‖.‖2F is the Frobenius norm and λ is a design
parameter. The first term in the above loss function is
the reconstruction error and the second term is the regu-
larization with λ providing a trade-off between them. If
data is concentrated on a low-dimensional manifold, the
CAE will learn a stochastic mapping from the input to the
manifold. It is shown in [38] that DAE can also learn the data
manifold when the dimension of the internal representation
is constrained.
An alternative perspective to auto-encoders is an algo-
rithm that extracts features with maximum mutual informa-
tion with the data. Assume the encoder is a function e()
with parameters We, and the goal is to find features f that
have maximum mutual information with the original data
T. The mutual information is
I(T; f) = H(T)−H(T|f) (3)
Since the entropy of the data, i.e. H(T), is independent of
the parameters We, maximizing the above mutual informa-
tion reduces to minimizing the conditional entropy as
Wˆe = arg min
We
H(T|f) (4)
Using the definition of conditional entropy, we have
Wˆe = arg max
We,p˜
E(T,f)[log p˜(T|f)] (5)
in which the optimization problem is solved over all possi-
ble conditional probability density functions p˜(T|f). How-
ever, when a particular structure of the decoder is chosen,
the space of p˜(T|f) is restricted and the criterion in (5)
provides a lower bound on the conditional entropy in (4).
5The maximization problem (5) can also be expressed in
terms of the cross-entropy loss. Let pˆ(T|Tˆ;We,Wd) denote
the conditional T|Tˆ in which the encoder and decoder
parameters We and Wd, respectively, are explicitly shown
to emphasize that the density function is constrained by the
structure of the encoder and the decoder. Note that f = e(Tˆ)
is a deterministic relation. The optimization problem in (5)
then amounts to
Wˆe, Wˆd = arg min
We,Wd
H
(
p(Tˆ)‖pˆ(T|Tˆ;We,Wd)
)
(6)
in which H(P‖Q) = EP (X)[− logQ(X)] is the cross-
entropy between densities P and Q. Hence, to extract fea-
tures that have maximum mutual information with data, the
optimum parameters of the auto-encoder should minimize
the cross-entropy between the distributions of the noisy
measurements and the reconstructed data.
To gain further insights into the auto-encoder with
the cross-entropy loss, we rewrite the conditional
p˜(T|f) in the maximization problem of (5) in terms
of pˆ(Tˆ|T;We,Wd)pˆ(T;We,Wd). Hence, the optimization
problem reduces to
Wˆe, Wˆd = arg max
We,Wd
E(T,Tˆ)
[
log pˆ(Tˆ|T;We,Wd)
+ log p(T;We,Wd)
]
= arg max
We,Wd
{
E(T,Tˆ)
[
log pˆ(Tˆ|T;We,Wd)
]
−H(T)
}
(7)
According to (7), the optimization goal in a max information
auto-encoder consists of two terms: 1) the expectation of the
conditional log-likelihood Tˆ|Twhich should be maximized,
and 2) the entropy of the reconstructed data that should
be minimized. The second term can be considered as a
regularization on the auto-encoder. Hence, the max infor-
mation auto-encoder is a regularized maximum likelihood
optimizer in which the regularization is minimizing the
entropy of the reconstruction.
Assume the corruption process is additive Gaussian
noise, i.e. Tˆ = T + N, in which N ∼ N (0,Σ) and Σ is
the covariance of the noise. The conditional Tˆ|T is
p(Tˆ|T) = 1√
(2pi)N |Σ|e
−(Tˆ−T)TΣ−1(Tˆ−T) (8)
Replacing this density into the optimization problem of (7),
we have
Wˆe, Wˆd =
arg min
We,Wd
{
E(T,Tˆ)
[
(Tˆ−T)TΣ−1(Tˆ−T)
]
+H(T)
} (9)
Assuming that the auto-encoder has converged to the op-
timal solution, the first term in (9) is simply the mean-
square error (MSE) between the input and output of the
auto-encoder while the second term is the regularization on
the entropy of the output.
In this paper, we assume a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution for the measurements, and we employ MSE as the
loss function of the auto-encoder. Instead of the entropy
regularization, we use the constraint on the dimension of
the internal representation f as the regularization. Since the
distribution of the output, i.e. pˆ(T;We,Wd), is constrained
by the structure of the auto-encoder, lower dimension of the
representation implies lower entropy of the output. Hence,
under a Gaussian assumption for noise, the MSE auto-
encoder can be considered as a sub-optimal solution for the
max information auto-encoder.
According to the above discussion, the auto-encoder at-
tenuates measurement noises which are stronger than data-
dependent features and might result in incorrect estimates
of the intermediate variables. Further, the auto-encoder
encodes all data-related information of power traces into
a low-dimensional internal representation. Hence, there is
no need to identify points of interest in power traces. This is
especially important with misaligned measurements where
information about data is distributed over different sam-
ples. Finally, the auto-encoder provides a similarity model
among measurements. Power traces with similar features
have similar information content. This similarity might not
be observable in raw measurements with noise and mis-
alignment. The similarity model can be used to identify a
leakage model.
2.5 Leakage Modeling with Sensitivity Analysis
Given the extracted features from power measurements, we
identify which data features are encoded into the auto-
encoder features using sensitivity analysis. We recall the
leakage model of (1) in which the individual terms consti-
tute the data features. We postulate that power traces with
similar features are related to the intermediate values with
similar data features.
For an m-bit intermediate variable X , the number of
monomials XU in (1) is equal to 2m − 1 with U ∈ Fm2 \{0}.
Let MU () : RD → Ud be an unbiased estimator of a
monomial XU from power features in which Ud is the field
of values for a monomial of degree d = HW (U). The
uncertainty in the estimate of a data feature XU can be
measured by the information content of power traces about
the data.
A large amount of mutual information between the
observation f and a parameter θ = XU means that the
conditional entropy H(f |θ) is small, which implies that
the conditional log-likelihood function log p(f |θ) is concen-
trated. The first derivative of a concentrated log-likelihood
function, called the score, has large variations. The variance
of the score is defined as Fisher information, i.e.
I(θ) = Ef
[( ∂
∂θ
log p(f |θ))2] (10)
The inverse of Fisher information sets a lower bound,
called the Cramer-Rao bound, on the mean-square error
of any unbiased estimator of the parameter θ. Hence, the
uncertainty in the estimate of a data feature XU is inversely
proportional to the information content of measurements
about data. If the power consumption is not correlated with
a particular data feature XU
∗
, i.e. small mutual information,
the estimate of XU
∗
has a large uncertainty. This is the basis
of sensitivity analysis to identify those data features which
are highly correlated with the power traces.
Using a Taylor series expansion for an unbiased estima-
tor θˆ = MU (f) around its mean, i.e. θ, we have
θˆ ≈ θ +∇MTU · 4f (11)
6in which∇MU is the gradient of the estimator. The Cramer-
Rao bound on the variance of the estimate is the inverse of
the Fisher information as
Var(θˆ) ≥ I−1(θ) (12)
Using equation (11) in (12), we can express the follow-
ing bound on the Hessian matrix of the estimator, i.e.
∇MU∇MTU ,
Ef
[
4fT∇MU∇MTU4f
]
≥ I−1(θ) (13)
This relation implies that the curvature of the estimator
around the mean is lower-bounded by the inverse of the
Fisher information. By adding a small perturbation to the
function MU (), the estimate of the parameter will change
to θ˜ ≈ θ + ∇M˜TU · 4f in which ∇M˜U = ∇MU + δ and
δ is a small perturbation with a magnitude much smaller
than the gradient ∇MU . Assuming bT∇M˜U∇MTU b ≈
bT∇MU∇MTU b for any vector b, the variance of the change
in the estimate as a result of perturbations is then
Ef
[
(θ˜ − θˆ)2
]
≥ I−1(θ) (14)
The above analysis shows that if the observations f
have a large information content about a parameter θ, the
sensitivity of an estimate θˆ = MU (f) to slight perturbations
in the estimator function is small. This is consistent with the
analysis of shrinkage amount of coefficients in a stochastic
leakage model as discussed in [18].
3 SCAUL METHODOLOGY
The overall procedure of the proposed side-channel analysis
with unsupervised learning (SCAUL) approach is shown in
Fig. 3. The steps of SCAUL are explained below.
1) An LSTM auto-encoder extracts features from the
measured power traces. As the auto-encoder identi-
fies the data-dependent features in an unsupervised
approach, the traces may correspond to any inter-
mediate variable.
2) A multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network is
trained to estimate the bits of the intermediate vari-
able from the power features for all key candidates.
3) Following a sensitivity analysis, a slight perturba-
tion is added to the weights of the trained MLP
neural network. The variation of data features at the
output of the MLP as a result of the perturbation
is measured. Data features with lowest variation
constitute the leakage model.
4) The power features, extracted by the auto-encoder,
are clustered based on the identified leakage model.
The correct key exhibits the highest inter-cluster
difference.
The details on the structure of the neural networks in the
SCAUL technique are explained in the following sections.
3.1 LSTM Auto-encoder
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are popular for learning
temporal models of time series in applications such as natu-
ral language processing (NLP) [39], speech recognition and
acoustic modeling [40]. A Long short-term memory (LSTM)
neural network is a special type of RNN that can learn
both local (short-term) and long-term temporal dependence
of a signal. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have
also been employed for processing time series. While CNNs
are powerful in learning position invariance features, LSTM
networks are stronger in learning temporal models [41].
The basic cell of an LSTM neural network is shown in
Fig. 4. It consists of internal states c and h, the latter of which
is the output of the cell at every time instance. The input to
the cell is processed by a fully-connected (FC) network with
tanh activation. The internal state at each time instant is a
weighted sum of the previous state and the processed input.
The weighting process, called gate, controls the memory of
the cell. The forget gate determines how much information
of previous states is preserved at the current time instant
and the input gate controls the amount of input activation to
be added to the state. The output of the cell at time t, i.e.
ht, is calculated by applying tanh activation to the internal
state ct followed by the output gate. This gate controls how
much of the internal state activation flows to the output.
The weights used in the above three gates are determined
by three FC units with sigmoid activation. The input to
these FC units is the current input to the cell, i.e. xt, and
the previous output, i.e. ht−1.
The proposed LSTM auto-encoder for feature extraction
is shown in Fig. 5. The encoder and decoder are LSTM
networks with two layers shown in a time-unrolled represen-
tation; each of the encoder and decoder consists of a stack of
two LSTM cells, as in Fig. 4, however, the processing steps
of the cell are unrolled through time with the corresponding
input to the cell shown explicitly at every time instant.
The inputs to the encoder are the samples of the power
traces provided by a sliding window of lengthw and a stride
of s; i.e., at every time instant, the input is a vector of w
consecutive samples of the trace and the window is offset
by s samples relative to the previous time instant. This is
similar to a convolutional layer in CNNs. The first input
to the decoder is zero while the following inputs are the
individual samples of the power trace in the reverse order.
The outputs of the decoder are the samples of the filtered
power traces in the reverse order.
The loss function for optimizing the parameters of the
auto-encoder is the MSE between the input of the encoder
and output of the decoder. A constraint on the internal state
of the encoder/decoder cells is considered as a regular-
ization. After training the auto-encoder with all available
power traces, the internal state c of the top-layer encoder
cell is chosen as the features of power traces. We point out
that the c state contains most of the information about the
data. According to Fig. 4, the h state is derived from the
c state. Further, the c state of the top layer also contains
information processed by the preceding layers.
7Fig. 3. Conceptual description of the proposed unsupervised learning technique for power analysis (SCAUL).
Fig. 4. The basic cell in long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network.
3.2 Leakage Modeling with MLP
After extracting data-dependent features from power traces
with the auto-encoder, we estimate the intermediate vari-
able from the features with a multi-layer perceptron (MLP)
neural network. We train an MLP network for every key
candidate in which the input is the power features, and the
output is the bits of the intermediate variable calculated for
the key candidate.
The architecture of the MLP used in this work is shown
in Fig. 6. It consists of three hidden layers with ReLU
activation. The output layer is a set of m neurons, cor-
responding to m bits of the intermediate variable, with
sigmoid activation. The number of neurons at each layer,
used in our experiments for power analysis of AES, is shown
in the figure. The size of power features, that is equal to the
size of the c state of the LSTM auto-encoder, is 100, and the
intermediate variable is one byte (8 bits) of the AES state at
the output of an S-box.
To facilitate training of the MLP, the input power fea-
tures are normalized over all measurements. Let c(2)j , j =
1, 2, · · · , S denote the power features, extracted at the top-
layer encoder cell of the auto-encoder in Fig. 5, correspond-
ing to S power measurements. The input to the MLP is then
f˜j =
c
(2)
j −min
j
(c
(2)
j )
max
j
(c
(2)
j )−min
j
(c
(2)
j )
(15)
in which the normalization is carried out element-wise.
Hence, the inputs to the MLP are within [0, 1]. The outputs
are the bits of the intermediate variable corresponding to the
j-th measurement denoted by xj = (xj,0, xj,1, · · · , xj,m−1)
with values in {0, 1}.
After training the MLP with the normalized power fea-
tures in (15) and the corresponding intermediate variable
xj , a small perturbation is added to the weights of the MLP.
The perturbation is added at the first layer as shown in
Fig. 6. Let W0,1 denote the weights of the trained MLP
from input to the first hidden layer. The perturbed network
has the weights W˜0,1 = W0,1 + δ in which δ is a small
constant. The estimated intermediate variable at the output
of the perturbed network is x˜j = (x˜j,0, x˜j,1, · · · , x˜j,m−1).
We calculate the variation of the perturbation in a monomial
X˜Uj =
∏m−1
i=0 x˜j,i · ui for U ∈ Fm2 \{0} as
∆U = Ej
[∣∣X˜Uj −XUj ∣∣] (16)
in which the expectation is over all measurements.
According to the analysis of Section 2.5, the lower
variation of (16) implies that the data feature has a more
significant contribution to the power consumption. Hence,
in the leakage model of (1), we set
αˆU = 1− ∆U
max
U
∆U
(17)
We cluster the coefficients based on the variations of (16),
and select the coefficients in the cluster with smallest varia-
tions as the leakage model. This is similar to the constraint
on the degree of the model in the ridge regression technique
of [18].
The power features are divided into two clusters based
on the leakage model, obtained in an unsupervised ap-
proach. The correct key exhibits the highest inter-cluster
difference. This is the fundamental property exploited
in power analysis. Inter-cluster difference implies data-
dependency of power features.
8Fig. 5. Proposed LSTM auto-encoder for extracting features of power traces, with sliding window processing of input power traces. and c state of
top encoder cell selected as power feature.
Fig. 6. Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network for estimating bits of
intermediate variable from power features and sensitivity analysis.
4 CASE STUDY ON AES
Advanced encryption standard (AES) is a worldwide stan-
dard for secret-key cryptography. Several block ciphers have
also adopted structures similar to AES. In this section, we
demonstrate the SCAUL attack on an FPGA implementation
of AES. The principles of the attack are the same for any
cipher with a key-dependent operation in which the input or
output is known, and its power consumption is dependent
on the processed data.
The secret state of AES consists of 128 bits arranged
in 4 × 4 bytes. The cipher operations are carried out in
10 rounds with a composition of four transformations: Ad-
dRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns. At the be-
ginning, the plaintext is loaded into the state and the secret
key is added. The next operation is S-box, or SubBytes, which
is a nonlinear transformation operating on individual bytes
of the state. Next, ShiftRows and MixColumns operations
follow to complete one round.
The target of a typical power attack on AES is the S-box
operation in round 1. By denoting i-th byte of the plaintext
and the secret key as Pi and Ki, respectively, the key-
dependent cipher operation under attack isXi = S(Pi⊕Ki)
Fig. 7. Horizontal processing of power measurements during round 1 of
AES by the auto-encoder.
in which S() is the S-box function. The intermediate variable
is Xi which is unknown but correlated with the power
consumption during the operation of S(). Using the power
measurements, the intermediate variable can be estimated.
Hence, the input to the S-box, i.e. Pi⊕Ki, can be calculated
using the inverse S-box operation. Given the plaintext byte
Pi, the corresponding byte of the secret key, i.e. Ki, will be
recovered.
In our experiments, we use a lightweight implementa-
tion of AES (236 slices) on Artix-7 FPGA. The S-box function
is implemented with a look-up table (LUT). At every clock
cycle, the S-box is applied on one byte of the state. Hence,
the power trace of round 1 corresponds to 16 S-box opera-
tions, as shown in Fig. 7. The power traces corresponding to
S-box operations are selected using measurement windows
of length l at positions ri, i = 0, 1, · · · , 15. The length of
the windows are chosen based on the uncertainty in the
timing of the measurements. If there is an uncertainty of
∆l between the measurements and the clock signal of the
9Fig. 8. Power trace measured during operation of a S-box and filtered by
LSTM auto-encoder.
Fig. 9. Extracted features from power consumption of S-box operations
in AES plotted in 2 dimensions using t-SNE algorithm.
hardware, the length l must be at least lc + ∆l, in which lc
is the length of a clock cycle, so that the power trace include
all power samples of the corresponding S-box operation.
Processing of power traces as in Fig. 7 is similar to
the horizontal attacks of [2], [4] in which similar patterns
of power consumption through time, corresponding to the
same key subset, are analyzed to recover the key. However,
in the SCAUL attack on AES, the power traces correspond
to different key subsets. The main mechanism enabling such
horizontal processing of power traces in AES is the feature
extraction via auto-encoders. The auto-encoder can identify
data-dependent features irrespective of the value of the
intermediate variable. Using all power traces through time
improves the accuracy of feature detection, hence, signifi-
cantly reduces the required number of power measurements
to recover the key, as shown in the next section.
The filtering effect of the LSTM auto-encoder on power
measurements is shown in Fig. 8. It is observed that while
the underlying patterns of the power consumption are pre-
served at the output of the auto-encoder, strong noisy sam-
ples are filtered. The auto-encoder learns the patterns that
repeat in most traces and filters out instantaneous variations
that have low mutual information with the measurements.
The extracted features from the power traces with an LSTM
auto-encoder with 100 neurons in its FC components are
also shown Fig. 9.
Since the LSTM auto-encoder has 100 neurons in the FC
components, the extracted features also have a dimension
of 100. The features are shown in the 2-dimensional plot of
Fig. 9 using t-SNE algorithm [42]. Each point in the plot
represents the mean of all features corresponding to the
Fig. 10. Variation of data features calculated with sensitivity analysis on
MLP neural network.
same intermediate variable. The non-uniform distance be-
tween the points reflects data-dependency; the intermediate
values with similar power features result in similar power
consumption. However, this similarity is not necessarily
on individual samples of power traces. Instead, the data-
dependent features of the traces, which might happen at
different time samples, are similar.
The power features extracted by the auto-encoder are
mapped to the bits of intermediate variable using the MLP
network of Fig. 6. According to the sensitivity analysis
of Section 2.5, the coefficients of the leakage model are
estimated. The variation of the monomials in (1) as a result
of small perturbation on the weights of the trained MLP
for the correct key candidate, calculated according to (16),
is shown in Fig. 10. The curve labeled with “HW model”
is obtained for actual power measurements on FPGA. It is
observed that the variation of monomials corresponding to
degree d = 1 are similar and lower than higher degree
terms. This implies a HW leakage model; individual bits
have the largest contribution to the power consumption
with the same weights. This model can be verified using a
DPA attack with an HW model, as shown in the next section.
To further verify the capability of the sensitivity analysis
with MLP, we conduct a hypothetical experiment as follows.
We group the power features into two clusters as shown
in Fig. 9. Then, we assign the values of the intermediate
variable with the most significant bit (MSB) of 1 to one
cluster and the values with MSB of 0 to the other cluster. We
train an MLP with the power features and this hypothetical
intermediate variable. The variation of the data features as
a result of perturbation on the MLP weights is also shown
in Fig. 10 labeled with “MSB model”. It is observed that the
variation corresponding to MSB (the first data feature) has
the lowest variation. It implies that the power consumption
is correlated with the MSB of the intermediate variable.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We demonstrate the SCAUL attack on an FPGA implemen-
tation of AES using the Flexible Open-source workBench
fOr Side-channel analysis (FOBOS) [43]. The FOBOS in-
stance uses a NewAE CW305 Artix-7 FPGA target for the
AES implementation, and Digilent Nexys 7 as the control
board for synchronization with a host PC and target FPGA.
We measure the power consumption of the target FPGA
during encryption of multiple random plaintexts with 125
samples per clock cycle.
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In all our experiments, we use the LSTM auto-encoder
of Fig. 5 with 100 neurons in the FC components of both
encoder and decoder cells. The sliding window at the input
of the encoder has a length of 10 samples and a stride of 2.
The LSTM auto-encoder and MLP neural network of Fig. 6,
for sensitivity analysis, are implemented in Tensorflow. The
Adaptive moment estimation (Adam) algorithm is used for
training all neural networks.
On a PC with Intel Core-i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM, and
Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPU, the LSTM auto-encoder
takes around 20 minutes to train with more than 20K traces.
Training of the MLP network with sensitivity analysis re-
quires around 25 seconds for a key candidate and around 1.8
hours for all 256 possible values of the key candidate. The
auto-encoder and the extracted leakage model are re-used
for all bytes of the entire secret key. Including clustering,
the overall time for a SCAUL attack would take around 2.5
hours for recovering the entire 128-bit key of AES.
5.1 Power Analysis with Leakage Model
In the first experiment, we conduct a model-based power
attack using the HW leakage model as a basis for comparing
the performance of the proposed unsupervised learning
approach in recovering the leakage model and the correct
key. We employ a DPA attack using both the individual
power samples, as in classical techniques, and the power
features extracted by the LSTM auto-encoder. The latter
reveals the capability of the auto-encoder in extracting data-
dependent features.
The results of a classical DPA attack with the HW model
are shown in Fig. 11 (a). For every key candidate the inter-
mediate variable X is calculated based on which the power
traces are grouped into two clusters C0 and C1; power
traces corresponding to the intermediate variable X with
HW (X) < 4 are in cluster C0 and those with HW (X) > 4
belong to C1. The mean trace of each cluster is obtained by
averaging all traces in the cluster. The absolute values of
the difference between samples of the mean traces in two
clusters are calculated. The rank of a key candidate is the
maximum absolute difference.
It is observed in Fig. 11 (a) that with at least 17400
power traces, corresponding to the power measurement
during the encryption of 17400 random plaintexts, the rank
of the correct key is always larger than all incorrect key
candidates in a DPA attack. Considering the fact that the
attack is successful with the HW model also justifies the
results of Fig. 10 in which the sensitivity analysis with the
MLP suggests an HW leakage model.
To verify the effect of the auto-encoder, we repeat a
DPA attack similar to the above attack by replacing the raw
power traces with the power features of (15) extracted by
the auto-encoder. The rank of key candidates versus the
number of power measurements (encryptions) is shown in
Fig. 11 (b). It is observed that using the power features, only
1600 measurements are sufficient to identify the correct key,
i.e., an improvement of more than 10× in attack efficiency
compared to classical DPA.
The significant effect of the auto-encoder in improving
the performance of the DPA attack implies that the auto-
encoder extracts the most relevant features of the power
Fig. 11. Rank of key candidates versus number of traces in a DPA attack
with HW leakage model; (a) maximum difference of power samples, (b)
maximum difference of power features.
Fig. 12. Rank of key candidates versus number of traces in a SCAUL
attack with a leakage model obtained with sensitivity analysis.
traces that depend on the processed data. The noisy samples
of the power measurements add constructively in a DPA
attack for some key candidates which results in large inter-
cluster difference and hinders detection of the correct key.
However, the auto-encoder has the ability to identify data-
dependent features even in the presence of noise.
5.2 SCAUL Attack
The data-dependent features of power measurements ex-
tracted by the auto-encoder can also be used to identify the
leakage model efficiently. We repeat a similar DPA attack
with results shown in Fig. 11 (b) but this time we employ
the leakage model identified by the sensitivity analysis of
Section 2.5 instead of the HW model. The rank of key
candidates versus the number of power measurements is
shown in Fig. 12. We notice that the correct key takes the
highest rank if at least 3700 measurements (encryptions) are
available. This is a degradation of around 2.3× in efficiency
compared to a model-based attack.
We point out that the power features used in the SCAUL
attack with the results in Fig. 12 are the same features as
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Fig. 13. Rank of key candidates versus number of traces in a DPA attack
with HW leakage model and misaligned traces; (a) maximum difference
of power samples, (b) maximum difference of power features.
in Fig. 11 (b). The larger amount of measurements required
in SCAUL compared to a model-based attack is the cost of
detecting a proper leakage model. In other words, if a prior
information is available, it can be used to achieve higher
efficiency with the auto-encoder features. Otherwise, more
measurements are required to retrieve the information.
5.3 Misaligned Traces
In addition to unsupervised leakage detection and sig-
nificant efficiency improvement, another major advantage
of SCAUL over classical power analysis techniques is the
ability to recover the secret key even with non-synchronous
measurements.
In this experiment, we let the measurement windows for
extracting power traces of individual S-box operations, as
shown in Fig. 7, take on a random shift. Specifically, we
locate the windows on positions ri + si, i = 0, 1, · · · , 15
in which si’s are uniformly distributed random variables
in [−12.5, 12.5] and ri’s are the accurate positions of S-box
operations. It simulates a scenario in which the timing of
the measurements is imprecise with an uncertainty equal to
20% of the hardware clock cycle. We set the length of the
windows to 150 samples to cover the entire duration of a
S-box operation amid the misalignment.
The result of a classical DPA attack with HW model and
misaligned traces is shown in Fig. 13 (a). As expected the
correct key is not distinguishable with 20K measurements
since classical techniques assume data-dependent features
appear at the same time sample. However, by using the
auto-encoder power features, the correct key is recovered
with only 8500 measurements as shown in Fig. 13 (b). This
experiment demonstrates that the data-dependent features
are encoded into the internal representation of the auto-
encoder even if they are spread over different time samples.
Fig. 14. Rank of key candidates versus number of traces in a SCAUL
attack with a leakage model obtained with sensitivity analysis and mis-
aligned power traces.
The result of an SCAUL attack with misaligned measure-
ments and sensitivity analysis for leakage model detection
is shown in Fig. 14. It is observed that even without using
prior knowledge of a leakage model and with misaligned
traces, SCAUL is able to recover the correct key with 12300
measurements. Hence, the extracted features of the auto-
encoder contain all information about data-dependent sam-
ples of the power traces sufficient for leakage detection.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We introduced an unsupervised learning approach for side-
channel analysis, called SCAUL, capable of extracting infor-
mation about data processed on hardware without requiring
prior knowledge on the leakage model or training data. At
the heart of SCAUL, there is an auto-encoder that encodes
the data-dependent samples of the power measurements
into a neural representation with the highest mutual infor-
mation with the secret data, and which is used for identi-
fying a proper leakage model using sensitivity analysis. On
a lightweight implementation of AES on Artix-7 FPGA, we
demonstrated that an LSTM auto-encoder can improve the
efficiency of a classical model-based DPA attack by 10×.
We also showed that SCAUL is able to identify a proper
leakage model from the auto-encoder features and recover
the correct key with less than 3700 measurements, compared
to 17400 traces required in a DPA attack. With imprecise
measurements in which the timing uncertainty is around
20% of the hardware clock cycles, SCAUL can still recover
the secret key with 12300 measurements while classical DPA
fails to detect the key with more than 20K traces.
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